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Tensions and Synergies in Religious Liberty:
An Evaluation of the Interrelation of Freedom of
Belief with Other Human Rights; Parallel Equality
and Anti-discrimination Provisions; Enforcement in
Competing European Courts; and Mediated Dispute
Resolution
Mark Hill QC*
INTRODUCTION
Despite its sixty year history, the European Court of Human
Rights has only recently begun to develop a cohesive systematic
jurisprudence on freedom of religion and belief. Hitherto, other
articles were generally engaged in conjunction with those touching
religious liberty—for example, freedom of association or freedom of
expression—and having found a violation in relation to one of these
articles, the Court has deemed it unnecessary to consider the
separate and parallel violation of Article 9. Thus, the academic world
has been denied detailed and systematic judicial pronouncements on
the reach of freedom of religion and belief and the extent to which it
may be qualified by other human rights. As yet, therefore there is
only a nascent body of jurisprudence by which commentators can
fully assess the extent to which the European Court of Human
Rights positions the place of religion in a democratic society.
However, such limited pronouncements as exist promote the
importance and centrality of freedom of religion and belief as being a
core component to human existence. Where the jurisprudence is
largely silent, however, is in the tension which exists between
religious liberty and other rights protected by the Convention and
by other international instruments.

* Centre for Law and Religion, Cardiff University, United Kingdom; Extraordinary Professor,
Department of Church Polity, University of Pretoria, South Africa. This address was given at
the Twentieth Annual Law and Religion Symposium at the J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University in October 2013.
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There are obvious synergies between associational rights and
freedom of expression and religious liberty, since faith is lived out in
community with others and by outward manifestations. But the
more complex—and more tendentious—clash is with the right of
family life. The understanding of “family” is now very different from
when the court was established sixty years ago. As a matter of law
(the Convention being a “living instrument,” reinventing meanings
and definitions with societal changes over generations) a same-sex
relationship is now considered a “family”—even though many
religious groups find this concept doctrinally unacceptable.
I. GAY RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN EXAMPLE FROM THE
UNITED KINGDOM
An example of the conflict between faith and human sexuality
arose recently in the UK: Lillian Ladele was a devout Christian. She
was employed by Islington Borough Council as a registrar of
marriages. She did this job conscientiously for many years. Then the
law changed in the UK. Civil partnerships were introduced and these
were to be registered by marriage registrars. For a while Islington
arranged its rosters so that Lilian only registered marriages. Many
other councils made similar arrangements. However, after persistent
lobbying from gay colleagues, Islington changed its policy and
required all its registrars to register both marriages and civil
partnerships.
Due to her religious beliefs, Lilian in good conscience could not
register civil partnerships. She resigned from her job and brought a
claim against Islington for constructive dismissal. She lost. She ought
to have won because Islington could and should have
accommodated her beliefs. Sadly, she also lost in the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 1 The court applied the “margin
of appreciation” deferring the value judgment to the legislature and
judiciary of the member state: a form of moral subsidiarity.
But in the linked appeal of Eweida (heard at the same time),
there was no such restraint by the ECtHR: it micro-managed the
contractual terms of engagement concerning a private company
(British Airways) and one of its employees (a Coptic Christian). 2 In a
1. Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 &
36516/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, ¶¶ 23–30 (2013).
2. Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37.
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single judgment, the ECtHR both overreached itself and abrogated
its duty to secure human rights protection under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Lilian’s religious conscience was sacrificed at the altar of nondiscrimination. The Equality Act, which implemented a European
Directive, outlaws discrimination on the grounds of what are called
“protected characteristics”: sex, race, age, disability, sexual
orientation, etc. Islington council would breach its equality duty if it
discriminated on the ground of sexual orientation.
But where was the greater harm? No gay couple was denied civil
partnership status. Islington could still provide the service in the
borough. But Lilian was rendered unemployed. In pursuing a nondiscrimination agenda, the Court was complicit in a “race to the
bottom”: secularism triumphing over pluralism.
II. EQUALITY: A RISING TIDE FOR ALL RELIGIONS
As George Orwell famously observed in his novel Animal Farm,
although all men may be equal, some are more equal than others. 3
The concept of equality, therefore, needs to be clearly identified,
formulated, and implemented if it is not to become an instrument
which drives religion out of the public square, providing nothing
more than an anodyne core stripped of cultural, social, religious, and
ethical viewpoints which animate human well-being and interaction.
The nightmare vision of a white light of neutrality, bland and
blinding in its effect, needs to be replaced with a rainbow spectrum
of multi-coloured diversity, in which difference is valued and
respected, refracted through the prism of faith being lived out in
community.
In many ways, newly minted equality provisions, both of national
and international origin, can be used to promote the goal of
religious liberty in countries where, historically, there is a favored or
privileged religion: for example, the Church of England in part of
the United Kingdom or Protestant denominations in northern
Europe. To the extent that rights or privileges are afforded to one
church, the prohibition on discrimination under Article 14 of the
ECHR requires that similar rights and privileges should be afforded
to ALL churches. 4 This promotes a healthy pluralism and acts as a
3. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet 2004) (1945).
4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
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bastion against secularism. To adopt a nautical image, the rising tide
lifts all boats.
Properly nurtured, the principle of equality need not result in a
retreat into secularism, but can actively promote religious liberty, by
giving to minorities precisely the same rights and advantages as are
enjoyed by majoritarian or State churches. This key point of
engagement is precisely the issue which the ECtHR will need to
address in its determination in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. United Kingdom. The LDS church maintains that it is
disadvantaged since it is denied a favourable exemption from a tax
liability which is enjoyed by the Church of England and by other
mainstream Christian denominations. The judgment of the
Strasbourg is awaited. 5
III. PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF REDRESS IN EUROPE?
Europe has the benefit of (or is burdened by—depending on
one’s viewpoint) two pan-national courts. 6 The domestic courts of
member states benefit from these pan-national institutions for their
methodology and analysis, for the exposure of conceptual, cultural,
terminological, and linguistic misunderstandings amongst European
lawyers, and for the development of substantive jurisprudence. 7 The
respective courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg are distinctly
different in a number of ways, both procedurally and substantively.
They have rarely been compared systematically, hence the analysis
which follows.
The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959
under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 8 The Convention
charged the Court with the enforcement and implementation of the
14, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
5. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7552/09
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), was decided five months after this address was given in October 2013.
The Court held that there was no violation.
6. I am grateful to Thomas Jones for his assistance in researching this section of the
paper and to Dr. Russell Sandberg of Cardiff University and Dr. Ronan McCrea of University
College, London, for commenting on earlier drafts.
7. The benefits also extend beyond the territorial borders of Europe. For example, in
the 2007 Pillay case, Justice Pius Langa for the South African Constitutional Court referred to
the application of the margin of appreciation to faith-based cases in Strasbourg in his discussion
of the autonomy of school boards in determining uniform codes impinging on religious rights.
MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v. Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) ¶ 80 (S. Afr.).
8. Not to be confused with the European Union or any of its previous incarnations.
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ECHR in all forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is not related
to the ECtHR. 9 However, all EU states are members of the Council
of Europe and signatories to the ECHR. The CJEU refers to the
case law of the ECtHR and treats the ECHR as though it were part
of the EU’s legal system. All EU institutions are bound under Article
6 of the EU Treaty of Nice to respect human rights under the
ECHR. Under the Treaty of Lisbon (December 1, 2009), the EU
became a party to the ECHR, and thus CJEU is bound by the case
law of the ECtHR. 10
The ECtHR’s seminal judgment in the recent case of Eweida
and Others v. United Kingdom 11 provides a helpful snapshot of its
current approach to religious liberty. 12 In these conjoined
applications (one of which was made by Lilian Ladele, whose
treatment at the hands of the United Kingdom courts has been
discussed in an earlier section of this paper) the principles raised had
been adverted to in a lecture by Sir Nicolas Bratza. 13 They are
helpfully summarized in paragraphs 79 and 80 of the Court’s
judgment. 14
The Court stated that, as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion is one of the foundations of a
democratic society. 15 In its religious dimension, it is one of the most
vital elements that makes up the identity of believers and their

9. For a very full discussion of issues of religion within the institutional framework of
the EU, see RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2010).
10. For some hints on collaborative practice between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg
courts, see Jean Paul Costa, The Relationship Between the European Court of Human Rights
and National Constitutional Courts, Sir David Williams Lecture, University of Cambridge
(Feb. 15, 2013).
11. Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 &
36516/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, ¶¶ 23–30 (2013). For a detailed analysis of the decision, see
Mark Hill, Religious Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of
Strasbourg’s Judgment in Eweida and others v United Kingdom, 15 ECC. L.J. 191 (2013).
12. For a full analysis see Mark Hill, Religion and Anti-Discrimination Norms:
Strasbourg and Luxembourg Compared in the proceedings of the Third Convention of the
International Consortium of Law and Religion Scholars (forthcoming 2014).
13. Nicolas Bratza, The “Precious Asset”: Freedom of Religion under the European
Convention on Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9–
26 (Mark Hill ed., 2012), reproduced in 14 ECC. L.J. 256–271 (2012).
14. Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 ¶¶ 79–80.
15. Id.
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conception of life. But it is also a precious asset for atheists,
agnostics, sceptics, and the unconcerned. Religious freedom is
primarily a matter of individual thought and conscience, which is
absolute and unqualified. Manifestation of belief, alone and in
private, but also in community with others and in public (in worship,
teaching, practice and observance) 16 may have an impact on others.
Article 9 section 2 qualifies the right such that any limitation placed
on a person’s freedom to manifest religion or belief must be
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of
one or more legitimate aims.
After setting out these broad, well-established, and noncontroversial statements of principle, the majority opinion then
identifies three subtle but significant elucidations through which the
Article 9 right to freedom of religion is reinforced. In re-articulating
the ambit of Article 9, through this carefully voiced judgment, the
effective reach of the provision as an instrument for securing
religious liberty is significantly increased. 17 First, the ECtHR has
made plain that the duty of neutrality of individual governments “is
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the
legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way those beliefs are expressed,”
provided that the religious view demonstrates a certain level of
cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance. 18 Second, the
judgment outlaws the narrow interpretation of manifestation which
required a doctrinal mandate. While rightly acknowledging that
liturgical acts are self-evidently outward expressions of belief, the
ECtHR made clear that the manifestation of religion is much wider
than this. The third and most significant aspect of the Court’s
judgment is the laying to rest of a principle that had been gaining
currency in both Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence, to the

16. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, ¶
31 (1993); see also Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5, ¶ 105
(Grand Chamber 2005).
17. Significantly, this is the first adverse determination for the United Kingdom on
Article 9 since it became a signatory to the Convention and runs counter to the trend
identified in Silvio Ferrari, Law and Religion in a Secular World: A European Perspective, 14
ECC. L.J. 363 (2012).
18. Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 ¶ 81. This clarification might legitimately be applied, for
example, in the pending case of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 7552/09, communicated to the Government on 26 April 2011. The challenged
decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords can be found at Gallagher
(Valuation Officer) v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints [2008] UKHL 56.
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effect that if a person can take steps to circumvent a limitation placed
upon him or her, such as resigning from a particular job, then there
is no interference with the Article 9 right. 19
The emergence of a distinctive European jurisprudence is
valuable as a counter balance to denominational majorities and
religious nationalism. 20 From the Kokkinakis case in 1993 21 to the
French case Association Les Témoins de Jéhovah in 2011, 22 the
ECtHR has developed a robust protection of the rights and interests
of religious minorities. Sometimes national courts have paved the
way, but the contribution of the ECtHR cannot be ignored. In his
concurring opinion for the Grand Chamber of the Court of
Strasbourg in the 2011 appeal judgment on Lautsi, Justice Bonello
warned:
A court of human rights cannot allow itself to suffer from historical
Alzheimer’s. It has no right to disregard the cultural continuum of
a nation’s flow through time, nor to ignore what, over the
centuries, has served to mould and define the profile of a people.
No supranational court has any business substituting its own ethical
mock-ups for those qualities that history has imprinted on the
national identity. 23

In many ways, this represents the pursuit of transformative justice
instead of acquiescence in what might be considered to be the
untouchable identity of a given country. Similarly, in the Refah
Partisi decisions, the idea of the State’s role as supreme umpire or
moderator encapsulates what some consider to be “the European
project”:

19. As the Court states in the opinion of the majority:
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court
considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion
in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job would
negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to weigh that
possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was
proportionate.
Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 ¶ 83.
20. See Marco Ventura, The Changing Civil Religion of Secular Europe, in 41 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947–61 (2010).
21. Kokkinakis, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18.
22. Association Les Témoins de Jehovah v. France, App. No. 8916/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011).
23. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber 2011) ¶ 1.1.
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The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral
and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths
and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order,
religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. It also
considers that the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the
legitimacy of religious beliefs . . . and that it requires the State to
ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups. 24

The endeavour of the ECtHR was about reconciling principles with
reality. Justice Tulkens’s powerful dissenting opinion in Leyla Sahin
affirmed this:
the Court’s review must be conducted in concreto, in principle by
reference to three criteria: first, whether the interference, which
must be capable of protecting the legitimate interest that has been
put at risk, was appropriate; second, whether the measure that has
been chosen is the measure that is the least restrictive of the right
or freedom concerned; and, lastly, whether the measure was
proportionate, a question which entails a balancing of the
competing interests. 25

However, because human rights scholars and practitioners tend
to concentrate upon the ECtHR in Strasbourg, the potential of the
CJEU in Luxembourg has been largely overlooked. Article 10 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has very similar terms as Article
9 of the ECHR. 26 The CJEU characterizes the ECHR as an
instrument having “special relevance” for the determination and
interpretation of EU law, 27 and Article 52 section 3 of the EU
Charter states that Charter rights are to be interpreted consistently
with corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR. The EU
Charter, unlike the ECHR, is not a universal document of human
rights protection; instead its provisions apply to EU institutions and
member States when they are “implementing EU law.” 28

24. Partisi v Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, & 41343/98 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Grand Chamber 2003).
25. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5 (Grand Chamber
2005) (Tulkens, J., dissenting, ¶ 2).
26. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 10,
2012/C 326/02 (Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter EU Charter].
27. Hoechst AG v. Commission, joined cases 46/87 and 227/88, 1989 E.C.R. 2859.
28. EU Charter, supra note 26, art. 51.
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Council Directive 2004/113 of the European Community,
concerning equal treatment between men and women in the access
to and supply of goods and services, contains as Recital 3 of its
Preamble: “While prohibiting discrimination, it is important to
respect other fundamental rights and freedoms, including . . . the
freedom of religion.” 29 The EU Guidelines on the Promotion and
Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief 30 were adopted on June
24, 2013 by the EU Council of Foreign Affairs. The guidelines seek
to promote religious liberty in countries beyond EU borders. The
guidelines detail the EU’s approach to the freedom of religion or
belief which the EU will promote in its negotiations with other
countries.
Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), which was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
allows the EU Council to pass legislation combating discrimination
on grounds of on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age, or sexual orientation. It requires unanimity in the
Council. It does not prohibit discrimination in itself but acts as a
legal mechanism for the adoption of legislation designed to combat
discrimination, for example Directive 2000/78 31 and Directive
2000/43. 32
Article 21 of the EU Charter states that “[a]ny discrimination
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth,
disability, age, or sexual orientation, shall be prohibited.” 33

29. Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J. (L373) preamble (EC), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:373:0037:0043:en:PDF.
30. Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Promotion
and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (June 24, 2013), available at
http://www.consilium.euro
pa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137585.pdf.
31. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L303) (establishing a general
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation aimed at combating
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation as
regards employment and occupation).
32. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L180) (implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons of racial or ethnic origin).
33. EU Charter, supra note 26, art. 21.
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Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation aimed at combating
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or
sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation 34 was
adopted on the basis of Article 19 TFEU. It requires all Member
States to protect against discrimination on grounds of religion and
belief in employment, occupation, and vocational training, and
applies to everybody in the private or public sector and public
bodies. The Directive prohibits direct and indirect discrimination, 35
harassment, 36 instructions to discriminate, 37 and victimization 38
based on religion or belief. These terms are not defined in Directive
itself, leaving it to the Member States to do so.
Member States are required to transpose Directive 2000/78 into
their domestic legal systems. They are free to extend the prohibition
of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief to situations
beyond employment, occupation, and vocational training. 39 When
interpreting Directive 2000/78, the European Court of Justice is
required to have due regard to Strasbourg jurisprudence, the 1961
European Social Charter, and the 1996 Revised European Social
Charter. The proposal for Council Directive 2008/426 on
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual
orientation 40 was announced by the European Commission on July
2, 2008. As with Directive 2000/78, the proposal for Council
Directive 2008/426 applies to everybody in the private or public
sector and to public bodies. However, the scope of the proposal is
much broader, covering social protection (including social security
and health care), social advantages, education, as well as access to
and supply of goods and services, such as housing and transport.
The principle of equal treatment, as provided for in the proposal for

34. Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L303), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML.
35. Id. art. 2(2).
36. Id. art. 2(3).
37. Id. art. 2(4).
38. Id. art. 11.
39. For example, the UK Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on grounds of
religion or belief in relation to housing and education.
40. Proposed Council Directive 2008/426 (July 2, 2008), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0426:FIN:EN:HTML.
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Council Directive 2008/426, does not apply to differences in
treatment based on religion or beliefs vis-à-vis access to educational
institutions founded on a particular religion or belief. As with
Directive 2000/78, Member States may introduce or maintain more
protective provisions than the minimum requirements provided for
in the proposed Directive.
Corrigendum to Directive 2004/58 41 was adopted by virtue of
Articles 18, 21, 46, 50 and 59 TFEU with regards to the right of
citizens of the EU and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States. 42 The corrigendum
sought to remedy the piecemeal approach to the right of free
movement and residence by providing a single, all-encompassing
legislative provision. Recital 31 of the Preamble to the Corrigendum
states that: “Member States should implement this Directive without
discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds
such as . . . religion or beliefs . . . .”43
The document Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Non-Discrimination
and Equal Opportunities For All: A Framework Strategy 44 sets out the
Commission’s strategy for the positive and active promotion of nondiscrimination and equal opportunities for all. The Commission’s
strategy includes ensuring effective legal protection against
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief across the EU
through the full transposition by all Member States of the
Community legislation in this field, notably Directives 2000/78 and
Directive 2000/43, discussed above. Decision No. 771/2006 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, establishing the European
Year of Equal Opportunities for All: Towards a Just Society, 45 sought
to raise public awareness of the substantial community acquis in the
field of equality and non-discrimination.

41. Corrigendum to Council Directive 2004/58/EC, 2004 O.J. (L158) available at
http://eur-l
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0038R(01):en:HTML.
42. Formerly Articles 12, 18, 40, 44 and 52 TEC.
43. Corrigendum to Council Directive 2004/58/EC, supra note 41.
44. COM(2005),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0224&from=EN.
45. European Parliament Decision no. 771/2006, O.J. (L146), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006D0771:EN:HTML.
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An early sign of the general approach may be gauged from the
decision of the CJEU in the Steymann case. 46 The Court had been
asked to decide on whether a member of a religious community was
entitled to a pension for his work. The judges had to assess whether
the question pertained to a purely religious matter or had an
economic dimension, thus falling within the competence of the
Court. The judges stated that Article 2 of the EEC Treaty must be
interpreted such that activities performed by members of a
community based on religion or philosophy as part of the
commercial activities of that community constitute economic
activities insofar as the services which the community provides to its
members may be regarded as the indirect quid pro quo for genuine
and effective work.
There are a number of significant differences which, from a
litigant’s point of view, might tend to favor the CJEU over the
ECtHR: 47
i. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
The ECHR and the procedural rules of the ECtHR require that
any potential applicants exhaust their domestic remedies before
they claim relief in the supra-national court. This means that many
years can be taken up in domestic first instance and appellate courts
before an application is filed in the ECtHR. 48 Referrals to the
CJEU can be made at any time and declarations are generally given
more speedily in respect of interpretative decisions on EU
Directives;
ii. Delay
The backlog of cases in the ECtHR means that many years will
elapse between the incident complained about and the
determination of the ECtHR. 49 The caseload at the CJEU is
growing but it is does not have such a long backlog of cases.

46. Case 196/87, Udo Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1988 E.C.R. 6159.
47. It may be that trial advocates prefer Strasbourg to Luxembourg as the restaurants
may be considered superior.
48. In the case of Nadia Eweida, she was refused permission openly to wear the cross in
2006 but did not obtain declaratory relief from the ECtHR until 2013. It is of note that
British Airways relaxed its dress code within weeks of Ms. Eweida’s complaint so the issue had
become of wholly academic interest many years prior to the case even reaching Strasbourg.
49. At the end of 2011, the backlog of cases exceeded 152,000. See Ken Clarke hails
deal to overhaul European Court of Human Rights, BBC NEWS (April 19, 2012 12:16 ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17762341.
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iii. Margin of appreciation
The ECtHR consistently defers to national legislators in relation to
political, social, cultural, and other considerations. While the CJEU
openly acknowledges and applies the principle of subsidiarity in
many instances, no such elasticity is afforded in the enforcement of
EU Directives which are of direct application member states. The
CJEU’s interpretative jurisdiction is universally binding and takes
effect without any reference to a broad margin of appreciation. This
key matter is addressed more fully below in relation to principles of
equality.
iv. Political considerations
Some critics have commented on a lack of clarity and inconsistency
of decision making within the ECtHR. Others have pointed to the
ideological and political underpinning of its case law. It straddles
jurisprudence and politics, and as one commentator has indicated,
it occasionally overreaches itself. 50 The CJEU, though not immune
to political pressures, is not required to make the same type of
sensitive value judgments.
v. Parties
In the ECtHR, proceedings can only be brought against Member
States and the Government of that Member State is the
Respondent. However, with the leave of the United Kingdom
domestic courts, referrals are made to the CJEU by the actual
litigants in the disputes giving an immediacy and a pragmatism to
their decisions, which are often less theoretical and more rooted in
reality.

Returning to the uncertain dynamic between religious liberty
and equality provisions, the obvious question which arises is what
will be the level of discretion which the CJEU will leave to national
authorities in implementing and applying the non-discrimination
provisions of the equality directives in this sensitive area? A strict
interpretation could entail far-reaching obligations to accommodate
religion in the workplace that may not be acceptable to all Member
States. For instance, the Dutch interpretation of non-discrimination
law, which does not permit refusal to allow a Muslim school teacher
to wear a headscarf, would appear unacceptable to France. Although
EU directives may leave the forms and methods chosen to the

50. See the comments of Lord Hoffmann and David Cameron.
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discretion of Member States, the stated objective is binding. This
suggests a uniform outcome of discrimination claims across Europe,
at least as far as minimum standards are concerned. In the area of sex
discrimination this seems to be the case. The CJEU’s case law has
provided detailed rules which govern the interpretation and
transposition of the directives in all Member States. They ensure that
the levels of protection against discrimination to be derived from EU
law are identical between countries. 51
In comparison, the ECtHR leaves the signatory states a wide
margin of appreciation to regulate relationships between state and
religion, and it has been particularly deferential in its case law
concerning headscarf bans in public education. In the landmark case
Sahin v Turkey, 52 it held a headscarf ban at universities to be
compatible with the rights enshrined in the ECHR, “where
questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are
concerned, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably
differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be
given special importance.” 53
The ECtHR accorded particular importance to the lack of
common ground amongst the states party to the Convention on this
matter, and consequently the Turkish government was given a
significant margin of appreciation to decide whether it was necessary
in the Turkish context to maintain the ban. The ECtHR accepted
those arguments that referred to the specific Turkish history of
secularism and the strong political significance of wearing a headscarf
in Turkey allied to the growing influence of extremist political
movements. As a result, Turkey was allowed to prohibit not just
teachers but also adult students from wearing religious symbols in
educational institutions. Even in France, well known for its strict
laïcité, the legal ban introduced in 2004 extends only to primary and
secondary education, not to universities.
A similarly deferential approach might be politically attractive for
the CJEU. As has been pointed out by Bell, the EU often tries to
avoid getting involved in moral controversies. He refers to the
transnational (non)recognition of same-sex partnerships as an
51. For an overview of sex discrimination case law see e.g. E. Ellis, EUantidiscrimination Law (Oxford University Press 2005).
52. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5 (Grand Chamber
2005).
53. Id. ¶ 109.
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example. In this context the CJEU has taken pains not to adopt any
particular task. As Bell remarks: “This is perhaps best described as a
form of ‘moral subsidiarity,’ which regards issues of cultural or moral
sensitivity as best left to national discretion.” 54
Though politically understandable, such an approach might leave
vulnerable minority groups with less human rights protection than
majority groups. The German experience may provide an example
how this may resolve itself. The Bundesverfassungsgericht was
confronted with the question of whether it was constitutional for a
public school to prohibit a Muslim teacher from wearing a headscarf
in the class room. The Court held that this issue should be decided
through the democratic process and that any restriction would have
to be based on a formal act of the legislatures of the German Länder.
Subsequently several states adopted such legislation restricting the
right to manifest religion through certain forms of dress. Several
introduced legislation effectively banning Muslim religious attire
whilst leaving Christian symbols untouched. The difference in
treatment was sometimes justified by the argument that Christian
symbols are to be perceived as religiously neutral as they have
become part of the Western cultural tradition. As such, the
legislation was presented not as privileging one religion over another,
but as just protecting a neutral educational setting. To date, such
regulations have not been struck down by German courts as
incompatible with equality and non-discrimination. 55
A deferential approach by the CJEU potentially leads to widely
diverging outcomes of transposing the equality directives: they may
come to mean entirely different things in different countries. This is
all the more problematic as some of the issues engage potential sex
discrimination, an area where the CJEU traditionally has been strict
in not allowing widely diverging practices between states.
We will have to wait and see how the CJEU deals with this
situation. Will it impose a universal standard on all Member States in
these controversial areas or instead leave them a wide discretion?
Although Member States may choose the means to implement the
54. MARK BELL, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 120
(2002).
55. For an overview of the German developments see Ute Sacksofsky, Religion and
Equality in Germany: The Headscarf Debate from a Constitutional Perspective, in EUROPEAN
UNION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON MULTI-DIMENSIONAL
EQUALITY LAW 353–70 (Dagmar Schiek & Victoria Chege eds., 2009).
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non-discrimination standards laid down in the equality directives,
they are bound to achieve an equal outcome, namely to guarantee an
equal level of protection against discrimination on grounds of
religion, sex and race. Yet, it is hard to conceive of a substantively
uniform level of protection that would be politically acceptable in all
EU countries. Approaches in the UK and France, to name but two,
are worlds apart.
IV. NON-JUSTICIABILITY AND MEDIATION: TWIN PILLARS FOR
SAFEGUARDING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
This paper has concentrated upon the institutional safeguarding
of religious liberty in domestic and international courts. This is
unsurprising having regard to the author’s position as both a scholar
of religious liberty and a trial lawyer. The decisions of judges in
disputed cases provide a practical framework for working out the
competing rights of faith groups and the state. But care must be
taken in using this growing jurisprudence as a socio-cultural means
of evaluating the extent of the problem and the means of resolution.
Litigation is thankfully rare and the headline cases can often give
misleading indications. The decisions concerning Lilian Ladele and
Nadia Eweida, which have given context to much of the discussion
in this paper, might suggest a highly litigious workforce and an
immovable and bigoted body of private and public sector employers.
The truth, I venture, is rather different. Every day, up and down the
country, small differences are being accommodated in the workplace
with good grace and practical good sense. Give and take is the order
of the day, and little compromises at a grass roots level ensure a
harmonious workforce where religious sensibilities are taken into
account by simple, practical measures.
There are two separate but complementary reasons why disputes
of this nature should be kept out of the courts. First, we have
unrealistic expectations of our judiciary. Judges hate religious
disputes and are ill-equipped to deal with them. They lack the
appropriate knowledge, as there is a profound religious illiteracy
within the government, the executive, and the judiciary. A small
improvement is that the recent Equality Act has introduced a new
provision allowing a judge to appoint an expert to advise him or her
with respect to the protected characteristic (e.g. race, disability, or
religion). However, in relation to matters of doctrine, this is an area
into which courts should not trespass. The precise extent of the
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principle of judicial restraint which stems from the non-justiciability
of religious disputes will be considered by the United Kingdom
Supreme Court in February 2014 when it hears the appeal in Khaira
v. Shergill, 56 concerning doctrinal issues in a dispute involving Sikh
gurdwara in England and the claims of religious leaders based in
India.
Second, parallel with judicial self-restraint comes the principle of
mediation and alternative dispute resolution. The major Abrahamic
faiths each espouse the doctrine of being reconciled with one’s
neighbor and avoiding litigation. This scriptural enjoinder seems at
times to be singularly lacking in a society which is becoming
increasing litigious, with civic rights trumping social duty. Article 6
of the ECHR gives a right to a fair trial, but ought there be a
corresponding obligation to refrain from engaging in unedifying
litigation? Far better than taking matters to court, a culture of civility
should encourage individuals to resolve matters in the workplace, the
school, the university, and so on. 57 Sensible people can generally
come to workable compromises.
For centuries religions have led the world in humanitarian work,
education, healthcare, and the relief of poverty. Perhaps now is the
time for people of faith and communities of faith to be judged by
their deeds not their words and to show their value to society
through promotion of mediation and reconciliation: “By their fruits
shall you know them.”

56. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 983.
57. The author is a founder and now co-chair of BIMA (Belief in Mediation and
Arbitration), a charity established in the United Kingdom to encourage alternative dispute
resolution of matters with a religious dimension. All major faith groups are represented in
BIMA, which runs educational activities in addition to providing co-mediators for the
resolution of disputes.
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